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INTRODUCTION
When I last studied this issue—the eligibility of domestic violence
survivors for asylum in the United States—I concluded: “the absence
of binding norms remains a major impediment to fair and consistent
* Co-Legal Director at the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies of the University of
California Hastings College of the Law (CGRS); amicus curiae in Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. &
N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014); and author of Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of
206 Case Outcomes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107
(2013). A version of this paper was presented in February 2015 at the Southwestern Journal of
International Law Symposium, The Global Struggle for Women’s Equality. A heartfelt thank
you to the organizers of that event, in particular, Kelley Fox. I also extend gratitude to CGRS
Program Associate Sarah Adams, and our interns working under her supervision, for their per-
sistence in tracking the outcomes of the cases analyzed herein; my colleagues, Deputy Director
Moira Duvernay and Co-Legal Director Eunice Lee, for their editorial contributions; and CGRS
founder and Director Karen Musalo for her unyielding wisdom and dedication which propelled
the A-R-C-G- victory in 2014, and untold others before and since.
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outcomes for women who fear return to countries where they con-
front unimaginable harms, or worse, death.”1 Despite a recent deci-
sion by the highest immigration tribunal in the United States
accepting that women fleeing domestic violence can meet the refugee
definition and qualify for protection,2 I could write the same words
today. The 2014 ruling in a case known as Matter of A-R-C-G- marked
a critical advancement in U.S. law.3 Notwithstanding, in the year since
that decision, arbitrary and inconsistent outcomes have continued to
characterize asylum adjudication in this area of the law.
I do not mean to diminish the importance of the A-R-C-G- prece-
dent, a long-awaited and hard-fought victory. Issued by the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board), the decision constitutes bind-
ing precedent for immigration judges (and asylum officers) across the
country who often have the final word in these life or death matters
because adverse decisions are not often appealed, and if appealed, the
vast majority are upheld.4 For thirteen years, from the vacating of the
well-known and controversial Matter of R-A- decision denying asylum
to a domestic violence survivor in 2001, to the issuance of the A-R-C-
G- decision in 2014, immigration judges and asylum officers adjudi-
cated domestic violence asylum claims without the benefit of jurispru-
dential (or regulatory) guidance.5 During that period, some
1. Blaine Bookey, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum: An Analysis of 206 Case Out-
comes in the United States from 1994 to 2012, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 107, 110 (2013) (re-
viewing and analyzing unpublished decisions from immigration judges and the Board of
Immigration Appeals across the country).
2. Karen Musalo, Personal Violence, Public Matter: Evolving Standards in Gender-Based
Asylum Law, 36 HARV. INT’L REV. 45, 45 (2014-15).
3. 26 I&N Dec. 388 (BIA 2014).
4. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(g) (“decisions of the Board . . . shall be binding on all officers and
employees of the Department of Homeland Security or immigration judges”); see also, e.g.,
JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., LIVES IN THE BALANCE: ASYLUM ADJUDICATION BY THE DE-
PARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 68, 78 (2014) (discussing rates of appeals beyond the immi-
gration court level and success of applicants in securing reversal of adverse decisions).
5. The highly publicized case of Rody Alvarado, Matter of R-A-, has a lengthy, contentious
history. After suffering a decade of brutal violence at the hands of her husband, a former soldier,
Ms. Alvarado fled to the United States leaving two small children in her native Guatemala. An
immigration judge granted asylum to Ms. Alvarado but the government appealed. On appeal, in
1999, the Board reversed the grant in a published decision, rejecting the gender-defined social
group of “Guatemalan women who have been involved intimately with Guatemalan male com-
panions who believe that women are to live under male domination,” accepted by the judge. For
the next ten years, Ms. Alvarado’s case was considered by three successive U.S. Attorneys
Generals. Eventually, the government reversed its position, conceding that Ms. Alvarado had
established eligibility for asylum. By stipulation of the parties, the immigration judge finally,
again, granted asylum on remand in 2009. During the course of her case, in 2000, the government
proposed asylum regulations that would have provided guidance for handling gender cases, in-
cluding removing barriers that the negative decision in Ms. Alvarado’s case presented. The gov-
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immigration judges granted protection through a fair application of
existing legal standards—for example, looking to the landmark Matter
of Kasinga ruling establishing that gender-based harms (even those
perpetrated by relatives or the broader community like female genital
cutting in that case) could be persecution for asylum purposes.6 On
the other hand, judges rejected domestic violence as a basis for asylum
categorically, reasoning that domestic violence is “personal” or “pri-
vate” in nature, and thus is not a matter of public concern or state
responsibility.7 Women who appealed denials faced legal limbo, as the
Board placed their cases on hold due to the lack of binding standards
definitively recognizing domestic violence as a viable claim to asylum.8
During the pendency of their appeals, women often faced prolonged
separation from their children, whom they made the agonizing deci-
sion to leave behind.9 The fact that the Board has begun resolving
appeals that were pending before A-R-C-G- was decided, sending sev-
eral cases back to the immigration courts to afford women the oppor-
tunity to submit additional evidence and argument to meet the new
standard, is momentous.10
The timing of the A-R-C-G- decision has also proven significant
for more recent arrivals. Many of the migrant women caught up in the
recent rise (or “surge”) of women and children seeking asylum at the
U.S.-Mexico border are fleeing domestic violence and other gender-
motivated harms.11 Whether these Central American women qualify
ernment never finalized these regulations. See generally Bookey, supra note 1, at 112-117
(providing more background on Ms. Alvarado’s case, and on the evolution of asylum law’s treat-
ment of domestic violence survivors); Matter of R-A-, 22 I&N Dec. 906 (BIA 1999).
6. 21 I&N Dec. 357, 365 (BIA 1996).
7. See Bookey, supra note 1, at 110 (this study analyzes a unique dataset of over 200 do-
mestic violence asylum decisions at the immigration court and BIA levels collected by CGRS
over nearly twenty years; to my knowledge, it is the only study of its kind); Musalo, supra note 2,
at 46.
8. See Bookey, supra note 1, at 109-10.
9. See id. at 108.
10. See, e.g., Center for Gender & Refugee Studies Database Cases No. 12389 (BIA May
21, 2015) [hereinafter CGRS Database Case]; CGRS Database Cases No. 10627 (BIA April 2,
2015); CGRS Databases Case No. 11652 (BIA March 12, 2015); CGRS Databases Case No.
12276 (BIA Feb. 24, 2015); see infra note 49 (describing decisions in the CGRS Database).
11. Starting in 2011, the United States began to record a dramatic rise in arrivals of unac-
companied children from El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. The numbers jumped from
around 4,000 children in 2013 to close to 70,000 in 2014, nearly doubling each year in between. In
addition, the number of family units (the vast majority women and their children) apprehended
rose from 11,000 families in 2013 to 60,000 in 2014. See CGRS & NATIONAL UNIV. OF LANUS,
ARG. (EDS.), CHILDHOOD AND MIGRATION IN CENTRAL AND NORTH AMERICA: CAUSES, POLI-
CIES, PRACTICES AND CHALLENGES 27, 42-44, 207 (2015), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/
files/Childhood_Migration_HumanRights_FullBook_English.pdf.
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as bona fide refugees has implications for policies and practices for
handling their claims. Most notably, the practice of detaining families
(i.e., women with children), resurrected by the Obama Administration
and argued as necessary to deter future migration, has been discred-
ited in particular due to heightened obligations toward asylum seekers
who have experienced trauma and express a credible fear of persecu-
tion.12 The successful litigation of women’s cases relying on the A-R-
C-G- precedent early on in the Administration’s use of family deten-
tion demonstrated that a significant number of the detained women
are in fact refugees entitled to special protections. This ultimately con-
tributed to the growing consensus that mothers and their children
should be released from detention centers.13
Notwithstanding the undeniable contribution of A-R-C-G- for the
broader legal principle it contains (that domestic violence may serve
as a basis for asylum), the legal holding in the case is narrow and fact-
specific, leaving immigration judges a great deal of discretion. This
latitude, coupled with the Board’s persistent attachment in A-R-C-G-
to the muddled definition of a “particular social group” discussed be-
low, has led to a hodgepodge of jurisprudence that undermines confi-
dence in the fairness and efficiency of the U.S. asylum system.14
Detained women, especially those without representation, suffer
uniquely and acutely as a result. Because of the deleterious effects of
detention on their physical and mental health, women will waive their
right to appeal erroneous decisions in the hopes of quicker release,
even knowing it will result in deportation to the same dangerous con-
ditions they escaped.15
12. Statements by several non-governmental organizations have been collected by the Na-
tional Immigrant Justice Center. Stop Detaining Families, NAT’L IMMIGR. JUST. CENTER, http://
www.immigrantjustice.org/stop-detaining-families#Background (last visited Nov. 6, 2015).
13. Within months of opening, the makeshift family detention center in Artesia, New Mex-
ico shut down under pressure from advocates. Out of the 15 cases that went forward with their
hearings before the immigration court, 14 won some form of protection (the one denial is being
considered on appeal). See id. (regarding opposition to family detention); Stephen Manning,
Ending Artesia, INNOVATION L. LAB, https://innovationlawlab.org/the-artesia-report/ (last visited
Nov. 6, 2015); Flores v. Johnson, CV 85-4544 (C.D. Cal. July 24, 2015) (court ordering children
and their mothers be released from detention, subject to certain qualifications).
14. See also Rebecca Hamlin, A Recent Shift in Immigration Law will Change Less than
You, WASH. POST (Nov. 7, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/monkey-cage/wp/2014/
11/07/a-recent-shift-in-immigration-law-will-change-less-than-you-think/ (discussing the U.S.
asylum system and limitations of a decision like A-R-C-G- to lead to broad and consistent
change). Several studies have found bias and arbitrary decisionmaking in the U.S. asylum system
including the seminal study JAYA RAMJI-NOGALES ET AL., REFUGEE ROULETTE: DISPARITIES IN
ASYLUM ADJUDICATION AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 1-8 (2009).
15. See, e.g., CGRS Database Case No. 11428 (Immigration J. Dec. July 15, 2015); CGRS
Database Case No. 11429 (Immigration J. Dec. April 24, 2015); CGRS Database Case No. 11579
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MATTER OF A-R-C-G-: CONTRIBUTIONS AND REMAINING
CONFUSION
For more than a decade, Aminta Cifuentes’s husband beat, raped,
and otherwise tormented her.16 He poured turpentine on her in an
attempt to set her on fire, which resulted in permanent hearing loss.
He also hit her in the stomach with such force that she gave birth
prematurely, and he punched her in the face so forcefully that she still
has difficulty breathing and speaking.  Ms. Cifuentes sought protec-
tion from Guatemalan authorities on multiple occasions, to no avail;
the police dismissed her complaints as marital problems, telling her to
go home to her husband where she was exposed to his escalating
threats. When she tried to leave, her husband hunted her down and
demanded her return. In fear for her life, Ms. Cifuentes fled to the
United States where her husband’s threats renewed, unrelenting.
A U.S. immigration judge found Ms. Cifuentes to be a credible
witness, but denied her applications for asylum and related humanita-
rian protections (withholding of removal and Convention Against
Torture relief).17 Ms. Cifuentes—following the legal theories set forth
in the earlier and well-known Matter of R-A- and Matter of L-R-
cases18—argued that her husband harmed her on account of her gen-
der and status as his wife (that is, on account of her membership in a
particular social group of “married women in Guatemala who are un-
able to leave their relationship”). 19 The judge referred to the harms
(Immigration J. Dec. Nov. 17, 2014); CGRS Database Case No. 11600 (Immigration J. Dec. Oct.
17, 2014).
16. CGRS Database Case No. 8767, Brief for CGRS to the BIA, CGRS Database Case No.
8767 (BIA Nov. 14, 2012).
17. The focus in this article is on asylum for simplicity. Much of the asylum analysis applies
also to withholding, which, although it differs from asylum in its respective burden of proof and
parameters of relief, also requires a showing of harm linked to an individual’s status or beliefs.
Convention Against Torture (CAT) claims differ more substantially in the legal standard and
requirements from asylum and withholding and so are not examined in detail.
18. In addition to the case of Rody Alvarado discussed in note 5, Matter of L-R- made
substantial contributions to the development of the law in domestic violence cases. The asylum
seeker from Mexico in L-R- endured more than two decades of atrocious abuse at the hands of
her common law husband, who forced her into the relationship in the first place. In 2009, the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) set forth the agency’s official position in domestic
violence cases, arguing that social groups defined by gender, nationality, and relationship status
could meet the Board’s social group test that (since the time of R-A-) had expanded to require
social visibility and particularity. The groups DHS put forward in L-R- were: (1) Mexican wo-
men in domestic relationships who are unable to leave; or (2) Mexican women who are viewed
as property by virtue of their position in a domestic relationship.  Supplemental Brief for Peti-
tioner at 15-16, Matter of L-R-, (BIA Apr. 13, 2009), http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/sites/default/files/
Matter_of_LR_DHS_Brief_4_13_2009.pdf [hereinafter DHS Supplemental Brief].
19. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 392 (BIA 2014).
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Ms. Cifuentes suffered as “unconscionable” but found that there was
“no rhyme or reason” to her husband’s abuse and therefore he did not
harm her on account of her gender-defined social group.20 In other
words, the judge concluded she did not establish the requisite “nexus”
between the persecution she endured and a protected ground. 21
On appeal, the Board reversed the denial of protection, recogniz-
ing for the first time in a published decision that women like Ms.
Cifuentes who fear domestic violence may qualify for asylum.22 Al-
though the Board’s decision stands for this broader principle, the spe-
cific holding of the case is quite limited, focusing solely on whether the
particular social group advanced by Ms. Cifuentes meets the legal test
for social groups. According to the Board’s current test, a social group
must be (1) composed of members who share a common immutable
characteristic, (2) defined with “particularity,” and (3) socially distinct
within the society in question.23 Social groups are to be considered on
20. Id. at 390.
21. To establish that the applicant is a refugee, and entitled to asylum, she must establish
that a protected ground (e.g., membership in a particular social group or political opinion) “was
or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.” Immigration and Nationality
Act § 208(b)(1)(B)(i) (2013). So long as the protected ground is at least one central reason,
additional non-protected motives may be present. For example, a sex trafficker may target a girl
in part for financial reasons (i.e., to make money) which is not protected. However, one central
reason may likely be her membership in a social group defined by gender and other characteris-
tics such as youth and unmarried status or ethnicity, which would be protected.
22. DHS, opposing counsel in immigration court, initially supported the judge’s decision.
The government changed position on appeal, conceding that Ms. Cifuentes suffered persecution
on account of her gender-defined social group and asking for remand to the judge for further
proceedings on unresolved issues in the case. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 390.
23. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 392. From 1985 to 2006, the Board applied a test
for social groups set forth in the seminal decision Matter of Acosta, 19 I&N Dec. 211, 212 (BIA
1985), rev’d on other grounds by Matter of Mogharrabi, 19 I&N Dec. 439 (BIA 1987). Under the
Acosta framework, a social group was one defined by immutable characteristics—that individu-
als either cannot change (i.e., innate characteristics like sex or shared past experience), or they
should not be required to change because they are fundamental to their individual identities or
consciences. In 2006, the Board began to require that groups not only be defined by immutable
or fundamental characteristics, but they also must demonstrate “social visibility” and “particu-
larity.” See Matter of C-A-, 23 I&N Dec. 951, 960 (BIA 2006), aff’d sub nom. Castillo-Arias v.
Att’y Gen., 446 F.3d 1190 (11th Cir. 2006). The imposition of these requirements has been met
with criticism by advocates and courts alike— the Third and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals
rejected them as unreasonable interpretations of the asylum statute. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v.
Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 603 (3d Cir. 2011); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 2009).
The Board recently claimed to clarify these requirements in companion cases, renaming social
visibility to “social distinction.” See Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 227, 228 (BIA 2014); see
Matter of W-G-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 208, 212 (BIA 2014); see also Benjamin Casper et al., Matter of
M-E-V-G- and the BIA’s Confounding Legal Standard for “Membership in a Particular Social
Group,” 14-06 Immigr. Briefings (2014) (further discussing the social group test).
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a case-by-case basis, and the asylum seeker must also prove she is a
member of the group.24
With respect to immutability—whether a characteristic is one
that cannot be changed or that individuals should not be required to
change to avoid persecution—the Board held that gender is clearly
immutable and that marital status can be immutable “where the indi-
vidual is unable to leave the relationship.”25 The Board noted that
ability to leave can be determined by looking to a range of factors,
such as “whether dissolution of a marriage could be contrary to relig-
ious or other deeply held moral beliefs or if dissolution is possible
when viewed in light of religious, cultural, or legal constraints.”26 It
then directed that, when making a determination about the immuta-
bility of the relationship, adjudicators must consider the applicant’s
own experiences as well as background information on country
conditions.27
The Board went on to consider the particularity of the group, that
is, whether the terms used to describe the group have commonly ac-
cepted definitions within the society in question to create definable
boundaries.28 In finding that the terms “women,” “married,” and “un-
able to leave” are clearly understood in Guatemala based on the facts
of the case, the Board looked to the social and cultural context in the
country, including documentation of widespread social expectations
about gender and subordination and legal constraints regarding di-
24. See DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 18, at 7.
25. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 393. This is unremarkable as the Board held that a
group could be defined by gender plus other characteristics first in 1996 and several Courts of
Appeals have recognized gender-defined groups in other contexts. See, e.g., Sibanda v. Holder,
778 F.3d 676, 681 (7th Cir. 2015) (married women subject to the bride-price custom); Cece v.
Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 672 (7th Cir. 2013) (en banc) (young Albanian women living alone who
were targeted for prostitution); Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 651 (7th Cir. 2011) (Jordanian
women who, in accordance with social and religious norms in Jordan, were accused of being
immoral criminals and at risk for honor killing); Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d 662 (9th Cir. 2010)
(Guatemalan women); Bi Xia Qu v. Holder, 618 F.3d 602, 607 (6th Cir. 2010) (women in China
who have been subjected to forced marriage and involuntary servitude); Ngengwe v. Mukasey,
543 F.3d 1029 (8th Cir. 2008) (Cameroonian widows); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 514 (8th
Cir. 2007) (Somali females); Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1199 (10th Cir. 2005) (females in
the Tukulor Fulani tribe); Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785 (9th Cir. 2005) (female mem-
bers of the Benadiri Clan); Yadegar-Sargis v. INS, 297 F.3d 596, 605 (7th Cir. 2002) (Christian
women in Iran who do not wish to adhere to the Islamic female dress code); Fatin v. I.N.S., 12
F.3d 1233, 1241 (3rd Cir. 1993) (Iranian women opposing certain gender-related laws). However,
it is remarkable that, to my knowledge, A-R-C-G- is the first new social group recognized by the
Board in a published decision since 2006 (when the Board first imposed the heightened social
distinction, then-called visibility, and particularity requirements to the social group analysis).
26. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 393.
27. Id.
28. Id.
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vorce and separation.29 The Board also considered Ms. Cifuentes’s ex-
perience with the police, who refused to help married women or
intervene in domestic matters, as relevant to establishing that the
group has meaningful boundaries in society.30
Lastly, the Board held that the group is socially distinct in Guate-
malan society. The Board explained that the following evidence
should be considered when evaluating social distinction: “documented
country conditions,” “law enforcement statistics and expert wit-
nesses,” “the respondent’s past experiences,” and “other reliable and
credible sources of information.”31 In the domestic violence context
specifically, this includes evidence that addresses “whether the society
in question recognizes the need to offer protection to victims of do-
mestic violence, including whether the country has criminal laws de-
signed to protect domestic abuse victims, whether those laws are
effectively enforced, and other sociopolitical factors.”32 For example,
country conditions demonstrating a culture of machismo and high
rates of violence against women without adequate response from the
police support the existence of social distinction. The enactment of
special laws directed at violence against women—such as Guatemala’s
law against femicide (gender-motivated killings)—are especially perti-
nent. Enactment of such laws indicates the group’s distinct status be-
cause laws directed at the general public are not enough to protect
group members who are in need of special protection.33 A woman’s
individual circumstances might include, like in the case of Ms.
Cifuentes, unsuccessful past attempts to leave the relationship or seek
protection.
After finding that the social group, “married women in Guate-
mala who are unable to leave their relationship,” is cognizable, the
Board remanded the case to the immigration court to address all re-
maining issues in the first instance.34 The Board directed the judge to
consider, for example, whether the Guatemalan government was “un-
able or unwilling” to control Ms. Cifuentes’s abuser, a requirement for
cases involving private actors as persecutors (as opposed to govern-
29. Id.
30. See id. at 393-94.
31. Id. at 395.
32. Id. at 394.
33. See id. at 394; see also, e.g., Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1092 (9th Cir.
2013) (en banc) (noting that “[i]t is difficult to imagine better evidence that a society recognizes
a particular class of individuals as uniquely vulnerable, because of their group perception by
[their persecutors], than that a special . . . protection law has been tailored to its characteristics”).
34. See Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. at 389.
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ment agents, e.g., the military or police).35 In addition, the Board
pointed out that if the judge were to find that Ms. Cifuentes suffered
persecution on account of a protected ground and that the Guatema-
lan government could not or would not control her persecutor, the
judge would further need to consider whether the government had
met its burden to prove that Ms. Cifuentes could safely and reasona-
bly relocate to another part of her country to avoid the persecution.36
On remand, the immigration judge granted asylum to Ms. Cifuentes at
stipulation of the parties without analysis.37
Although positive in many respects, and a leap forward for wo-
men’s rights, the Board’s decision in A-R-C-G- has not provided suffi-
cient guidance to decisionmakers to avoid the arbitrary and
inconsistent outcomes that characterized pre-A-R-C-G- jurisprudence.
First, the Board continued to adhere to the requirements of “social
distinction” and “particularity,” rather than return to the “immutabil-
ity” test that was the law of the land for over 20 years. Advocates (and
U.S. Courts of Appeals) have criticized these requirements as confus-
ing the law.38 They also set a high burden for the type of evidence that
asylum seekers must produce to establish existence of a social group
(e.g., as explained in A-R-C-G-, country conditions, law enforcement
statistics, and expert testimony), especially disadvantageous for wo-
men without representation. Matter of A-R-C-G- does little to elimi-
nate confusion and provide clear legal standards—how should judges
analyze cases where women are not married to their abusers but are in
other domestic relationships? And, what precisely are the contours of
the ability to leave determination, including  in cases where women
35. Id. at 395.
36. Asylum based on past persecution shall be denied where the government establishes by
a preponderance of the evidence that an applicant “could avoid future persecution by relocating
to another part of the applicant’s country of nationality. . .and under all the circumstances, it
would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.13(b)(1)(i)(B) (2015); see
also Matter of M-Z-M-R-, 26 I&N Dec. 28, 33 (BIA 2012) (discussing the relocation standard
and holding that for an applicant to be able to relocate safely, “that location must present cir-
cumstances that are substantially better than those giving rise to a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion”). The regulations do not require that the harm an individual might face in another part of
the country that would make relocating unsafe/unreasonable be tied to a protected ground.
37. Because the government stipulated to a grant of relief in Ms. Cifuentes’s case, the judge
did not issue a reasoned opinion. See e-mail from counsel for Ms. Cifuentes to author (Feb. 27,
2015) (on file with CGRS).
38. See Benjamin CASPER et al., supra note 23, at 1. For a discussion of legislative fixes to
the difficulties of proving nexus to a protected ground in the gender context, see Eleanor Acer &
Tara Magner, Restoring America’s Commitment to Refugees and Humanitarian Protection, 27
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 445, 458 (2013).
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are able to physically separate from their partners, but the partners do
not accept that the woman has the power to end the relationship?
Moreover, even if it is less contentious now for women to estab-
lish the existence of a recognized social group, the A-R-C-G- decision
does not address how women can establish that their persecutor was
motivated to harm them based on their membership in the group.
What are the types of direct statements or actions on the part of the
abuser that demonstrate his motive is gender-based? And, how should
circumstantial evidence of country conditions demonstrating wide-
spread violence and discrimination against women be weighed when
considering an abuser’s motivations? The decision also provides no
guidance on evaluating the ability and willingness of governments to
control perpetrators of domestic violence. For example, how should
adjudicators weigh enactment of a special law aimed at preventing do-
mestic violence with evidence of a lack of enforcement of such laws?
Finally, because the decision reiterates the fact-specific and case-by-
case nature of the analysis, will the decision help ensure that cases
with similar facts have the law applied in a similar way to avoid arbi-
trary and inconsistent outcomes that marred adjudication in this area
pre-A-R-C-G-? The following discussion suggests the answer to that
question is: no, not yet.39
DECISIONMAKING IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ASYLUM
CASES POST-A-R-C-G-
The government does not make available to the public immigra-
tion judge decisions, or most non-precedential Board decisions, lead-
ing to a deficit of information on how cases are faring across the
country.40 At the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies at the Univer-
sity of California Hastings College of the Law (CGRS), we track out-
39. I am not arguing for 100% consistency in outcomes as the ultimate goal of the U.S.
asylum system, which would not be attainable or desirable for a system as large as the immigra-
tion courts. However, I am arguing that there is room for improved consistency in the quality and
accuracy of decision-making in the domestic violence area specifically. Although some judges
may remain resistant to domestic violence claims and search for grounds to deny, clear and
comprehensive guidance might be one way to achieve fairer outcomes that would restore public
confidence in the system and improve efficiency by avoiding prolonged legal processes.
40. The immigration courts and asylum offices maintain databases of case information,
which can be analyzed (and have been to a great extent, see, e.g., Refugee Roulette and Lives in
the Balance cited elsewhere as well as multiple studies and reports published by the Transac-
tional Records Access Clearinghouse of Syracuse University). However, the information con-
tained in the government databases is limited—while they record biographical information
regarding the applicant’s country of origin and age, for example, they do not track any informa-
tion regarding the type of persecution the individual suffered or the rationale for the adjudica-
tor’s decision to grant or deny relief. Moreover, gender of the applicant is not always recorded.
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comes in domestic violence and other gender asylum cases and house
the largest repository of immigration judge and Board decisions in
gender asylum cases nationally.41 For this article, the CGRS database
produced 67 decisions from cases of women seeking asylum based on
domestic violence (including 45 immigration judge and 22 Board deci-
sions) decided in the year since A-R-C-G-. 42 The immigration judge
decisions come from 30 different judges sitting in 22 jurisdictions.43
Most cases involve women hailing from the Northern Triangle coun-
tries of Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador; other countries repre-
sented include Cameroon, Colombia, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, Egypt, Mexico, and Nicaragua.
Patterns emerge from the decisions that illustrate the import as
well as the limitations of the A-R-C-G- decision and the ongoing need
for comprehensive, clear, and binding guidance from the Board, or
from the Administration in the form of regulations.44 To follow is a
brief analysis of common obstacles to protection in the cases of wo-
men fleeing domestic violence brought to CGRS’s attention through
our tracking efforts.45
41. CGRS collects decisions primarily through its technical assistance program, which pro-
vides consultation and litigation resources to attorneys. CGRS has also recorded several out-
comes in domestic violence asylum cases heard by asylum offices around the country which
hears affirmative applications. Because the asylum office does not provide written decisions with
analysis, those cases were not analyzed for present purposes. Technical Assistance and Training,
CGRS, http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/our-work/technical-assistance-training (last visited Nov. 6,
2015).
42. Some cases include multiple outcomes, for example, where the immigration judge de-
nied the claim and the decision was appealed to the BIA. We have on file written decisions or
transcripts of oral decisions for twenty-eight of the outcomes; for the remainder, we have on file
contemporaneous notes from oral decisions of judges provided to CGRS by attorneys for the
asylum seekers.
43. The judges presided over cases in the following cities: Arlington, VA; Atlanta, GA;
Baltimore, MD; Chicago, IL; Dallas, TX; Denver, CO; El Paso, TX; Eloy, AZ; Honolulu, HI;
Houston, TX; Los Fresnos, TX; Miami, FL; New York, NY; Orlando, FL; Philadelphia, PA;
Pompano Beach, FL; Port Isabel, TX; San Antonio, TX; Seattle, WA; San Francisco, CA; Ta-
coma, WA; and York, PA. As of July 2015, there were 243 immigration judges in the United
States and fifty-nine immigration courts. Challenges at the Border: Examining the Causes, Conse-
quences, and Responses to the Rise in Apprehensions at the Southern Border Before the S. Comm.
on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 113th Cong. (2014) (statement of Juan P.
Osuna, Dir., Exec. Office For Immigration Review for U.S. Dep’t of Justice).
44. See supra note 5 for discussion of the regulations proposed in 2000 that were never
finalized.
45. CGRS is continuing to track these cases, which will allow for more robust analysis of the
trends in jurisprudence evolving in the wake of A-R-C-G- in the future. To report an outcome,
and search the CGRS database, please visit http://cgrs.uchastings.edu/assistance.
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Credibility
Many immigration judges are sensitive to the dynamics of domes-
tic violence and impacts of trauma on survivors that may bear on the
credibility of women’s testimony (a necessary component of a success-
ful claim).46 For instance, in assessing the plausibility of the testimony
of a Honduran woman, a judge explained that the fact the woman
returned to her abusive spouse did not undermine her fear, given ele-
ments of control and intimidation that mark violent relationships.47
However, the historical bias against and discrediting of women’s testi-
mony as inherently unbelievable, a game of “he said-she said,” which
has been ameliorated in other areas of the law (e.g., in criminal law
through repeal of laws requiring corroborating evidence to prove
rape), remains in asylum adjudication.
A few cases illustrate the difficulties women survivors face in es-
tablishing the credibility of their claims. In one case, an immigration
judge found it implausible that a local judge and a priest would par-
ticipate in the forced marriage of the asylum seeker when she was a
girl, ignoring evidence that the girl’s family paid the officials and that
such practices are common in Mexico.48 In another case, a judge ex-
pressed disbelief that a woman’s husband would be able to give per-
mission to his brother to stay in the woman’s home because they had
separated and the husband no longer lived there. 49 The judge ignored
testimony that, despite their physical separation, her husband contin-
ued to control her, threatening to kill her if she had other men in the
house, which could plausibly explain why he sent his brother there—
for surveillance.
Another judge discredited an asylum seeker, stating: “[t]he mari-
tal relationship is intensely personal and complicated. Allegations of
spousal abuse compound the complexity. Because asylum proceedings
are ex parte it is difficult and sometimes impossible for an immigra-
tion judge to ascertain the veracity of domestic violence allegations
made by [an applicant] against his or her spouse.”50 Rather than ap-
plying the normal criteria for credibility in asylum cases—i.e., looking
to the detail, internal consistency, and consistency with country condi-
46. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(4)(B)-(C) (2015) (setting forth the burden placed on asylum
seekers to support their claims with credible, persuasive, and detailed testimony and the factors
judges may consider when making credibility determinations under a totality of the circum-
stances test).
47. CGRS Database Case, No. 10784 (Immigration J. Dec. Nov. 4, 2014).
48. CGRS Database Case, No. 11429 (Immigration J. Dec. April 24, 2015).
49. CGRS Database Case, No. 10950 (Immigration J. Dec. Jan. 14, 2015).
50. CGRS Database Case, No. 11335 (Immigration J. Dec. May 28, 2015).
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tions of the applicant’s testimony and supporting documentation—the
judge applied his personal views about the nature of domestic rela-
tionships. The judge created out of whole cloth a standard that does
not exist in the law—i.e., that marital relationships are too personal
and complicated to be able to make a credibility determination. This
judge’s evident distrust of women alleging violence by their partners
infected his entire analysis of the claim, ultimately denying relief to a
woman whose husband repeatedly raped and sodomized her including
after Guatemalan legal authorities declined to enforce a restraining
order.
Particular Social Group
As mentioned above, in A-R-C-G-, the Board recognized that a
group defined by gender, nationality, and marital status—“married
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship”—
met each prong of the social group analysis (immutability, particular-
ity, and social distinction).51 Whether social groups involving other
types of domestic relationships where women are not married to their
abusers should be recognized and the parameters of the “unable to
leave” characteristic of domestic relationships are two issues that have
presented divergent analyses among judges post-A-R-C-G-.
First, a split in the jurisprudence has surfaced regarding the ex-
tension of A-R-C-G- to cases involving women who never formally
married their abusers. Some immigration judges have found the exis-
tence of social groups for unmarried women, relying on A-R-C-G- to
recognize groups defined by gender, nationality, and relationship sta-
tus, such as “women from X country in domestic relationships they
are unable to leave.”52 In so doing, judges recognize that A-R-C-G-
does not require existence of a formal marriage, but rather, the in-
quiry centers on the existence and nature of the relationship and
whether it is immutable and recognized by society. This is consistent
with the “official” position of the government in the Matter of L-R-
case where the government argued that women in “domestic relation-
ships” other than marriage could proffer viable social groups.53 How-
51. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 388 (BIA 2014).
52. CGRS Database Case, No. 10796 (Immigration J. Dec. May 19, 2015); CGRS Database
Case, No. 11333 (Immigration J. Dec. Apr. 24, 2015); CGRS Database Case, No. 9730 (Immigra-
tion J. Dec. Apr. 2, 2015); CGRS Database Case, No. 11302 (Immigration J. Dec. Jan. 20, 2015);
CGRS Database Case, No. 10283 (Immigration J. Dec. Jan. 15, 2015).
53. There, DHS argued that “Mexican women in domestic relationships who are unable to
leave” or “Mexican women who are viewed as property by virtue of their positions within the
relationship” could meet the social group standard. DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 18.
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ever, other judges have distinguished A-R-C-G- on this same ground.
Judges have declined to apply A-R-C-G- even in cases where women
were in long-standing relationships with their abusers, had children
together, and held themselves out as husband and wife in the commu-
nity (common practice in some cultures).54
The Board has unequivocally rejected immigration judge deter-
minations distinguishing A-R-C-G- based on the marital status of the
asylum seeker on at least two occasions, in Matter of D-M-R- and Mat-
ter of E-M-.55 The Board clarified in Matter of D-M-R- that its deci-
sion in Matter of A-R-C-G- “does not necessarily require that an
applicant seeking asylum or withholding of removal based on domes-
tic violence have been married to his or her abuser. Rather, we look to
the characteristics of the relationship to determine its nature.” Inex-
plicably, the Board did not publish either decision, so judges are not
bound by them, and will likely repeat the same error. Indeed, in a
subsequent (also unpublished) decision, the Board upheld denial of
asylum to a Honduran woman who was not married to her abuser that
is at odds with the analysis in D-M-R- and E-M-.56 In that case, the
Board attached significant weight to the lack of a marital relationship
without considering any of the characteristics it deemed relevant to
the social group analysis in D-M-R- and E-M- regarding the nature of
the relationship. The Board is currently considering a request for pub-
lication of the D-M-R- and E-M- decisions to reconcile conflicting
case law and to provide guidance.57
Whether a woman is “unable to leave” a relationship, and thus
establish her membership in the social group, has also confounded ad-
judicators and led to disparate outcomes. The Board stressed in its A-
54. CGRS Database Case, No. 11018 (Immigration J. Dec. Mar. 4, 2015); CGRS Database
Case, No. 11428 (Immigration J. Dec. July 15, 2015); CGRS Database Case, No. 11856 (Immi-
gration J. Dec. Apr. 10, 2015); CGRS Database Case, No. 11564 (IJ Dec. Mar. 4, 2015); CGRS
Database Case, No. 11591 (Immigration J. Dec. Dec. 10, 2014); CGRS Database Case, No. 11579
(Immigration J. Dec. Nov. 17, 2014); CGRS Database Case, No. 11600 (Immigration J. Dec. Oct.
17, 2014); CGRS Database Case, No. 11541 (Immigration J. Dec. Sept. 11, 2014).
55. Matter of D-M-R-, CGRS Database Case, No. 11564 (BIA June 9, 2015); Matter of E-
M-, CGRS Database Case, No. 11541 (BIA Feb. 18, 2015) (holding “[a]lthough the legal re-
straints of divorce and separation may not apply to someone in a long-term, but not necessarily
legally formalized relationship, such as that of the [asylum seeker in that case] and her former
partner, the absence of a legal marriage is not ipso facto a distinguishing factor that precludes
otherwise analogous claims under the particular social group rationale set forth in Matter of A-
R-C-G-”).
56. CGRS Database Case, No. 11018 (BIA July 28, 2015).
57. Letter from the Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program, CGRS, and other
signatories to Juan P. Osuna, Director, Exec. Office of Immigration Review & David L. Neal,
Chairman, Board of Immigration Appeals, (June 18, 2015) (on file with CGRS).
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R-C-G- decision that the unable to leave inquiry is fact-specific, and
that judges should consider the asylum seeker’s own experiences as
well as country conditions evidence, but these general instructions
provide little specific direction. The Board failed to clarify that the
inquiry into a woman’s ability to leave should include not only an
analysis of whether legal or social constraints keep a woman from
leaving, but also an analysis of whether an abuser would recognize
such separation as ending his right to continue the abuse.
Some judges look to whether the asylum seeker succeeded in ob-
taining a divorce from her abuser, or moving out of their shared
home; and, if so, find that the existence of either scenario ends the
inquiry. Judges reach this conclusion even where abusers have pur-
sued their partners, and continued to stalk, beat, rape, or otherwise
terrorize them. 58 In other cases, judges consider the dynamics of do-
mestic violence and whether divorce or other physical separation en-
ded the relationship or whether the abuser refuses to recognize the
separation as ending his right to abuse his wife or partner.59
The facts of Ms. A’s case illustrate the need for clarity. Ms. A
obtained a divorce, but her ex-husband continued to stalk her before
she left the country; he inspected her vagina to ensure she had not
been with any other men and threatened to harm her if he believed
she had because she is still his “woman.”60 Should a woman in circum-
stances like Ms. A’s be deemed “able to leave” the relationship simply
because she divorced and moved out of the marital home? It is hard to
imagine that a reasonable adjudicator would reach this conclusion.
Nonetheless, without more comprehensive guidance from the Board,
adjudicators will continue to disregard facts relevant to cycles of vio-
lence present in abusive relationships.61
58. CGRS Database Case, No. 12489 (Immigration J.  Dec. May 19, 2015); CGRS Database
Case, No. 11333 (Immigration J.  Dec. Apr. 24, 2015); CGRS Database Case, No. 10950 (Immi-
gration J. Dec. Jan. 14, 2015); CGRS Database Case, No. 11541 (Immigration J.  Dec. Sept. 11,
2014).
59. See, e.g., CGRS Database Case, No. 12197 (Immigration J. Dec. June 29, 2015); see also
DHS Supplemental Brief, supra note 18.
60. CGRS Database Case, No. 11428 (Immigration J.  Dec. July 15, 2015); see also CGRS
Database Case, No. 10950 (Immigration J.  Dec. Jan. 14, 2015) (in case where persecutor contin-
ued to harass and abuse the applicant after she left, including once punching her in the vagina,
the judge distinguished from A-R-C-G- saying that she was able to leave).
61. Although judges did not cite a different country of origin as a basis for distinction when
analyzing the existence of a social group, it did come into play in the nexus and state protection
steps in the analysis discussed in the sections to follow.
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Nexus
In Matter of A-R-C-G-, the government conceded that Ms.
Cifuentes’s abuser was motivated to persecute her based on her gen-
der and status in the relationship (i.e., based on her membership in a
particular social group).62 The Board accepted this concession and did
not consider the issue, so the decision provides little guidance for the
type of evidence—direct and circumstantial—that supports a finding
of nexus in domestic violence cases.63 In the D-M-R- decision follow-
ing A-R-C-G-, the Board stressed the importance of societal context
when evaluating a persecutor’s motives in domestic violence cases.
For example, evidence regarding social and cultural norms in a coun-
try that reinforce subordination of women and superiority of men
would be particularly relevant to understanding the traditional role of
men and women in relationships. However, as mentioned, the D-M-
R- decision is not precedential, and cases presenting similar facts have
resulted in dissimilar analyses.
Take the cases of Ms. A (discussed above) and Ms. B.64 In both
cases, their abusers made statements to the women such as, “[Y]ou
know you’re mine;” called the women “prostitutes” and “whores;”
and threatened to harm the women if they tried to report abuse or
leave them. 65 The abusers also exhibited controlling behavior, an-
other hallmark of domestic violence.66 For example, in Ms. A’s case,
her abuser checked her vagina to ensure fidelity to him, and in Ms. B’s
case, her abuser followed her when she tried to separate from him and
demanded her return. In addition, in both cases, the asylum seekers
submitted significant background information on El Salvador (Ms. A)
and the Dominican Republic (Ms. B) regarding pervasive discrimina-
tion and violence against women, and social acceptance and impunity
for perpetrators. Based on her abuser’s behavior and statements that
correlate with country conditions on views of women and their proper
62. Matter of A-R-C-G-, 26 I&N Dec. 388, 395 (BIA 2014).
63. See id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(i) (2015) (setting forth nexus standard); INS v.
Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483 (1992) (holding that nexus may be established through either
direct or circumstantial evidence). For a discussion of the significance of circumstantial evidence
of country conditions in cases of gender-based violence, see Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 662.
64. Respectively, CGRS Database Case, No. 10283 (Immigration J. Dec. Jan. 14, 2015);
CGRS Database Case, No. 11428 (Immigration J. Dec. July 15, 2015).
65. CGRS Database Case, No. 10283 (Immigration J. Dec. Jan. 14, 2015); CGRS Database
Case, No. 11428 (Immigration J. Dec. July 15, 2015).
66. See Expert Declaration of Professor Nancy K. D. Lemon (Feb. 18, 2014) (on file with
CGRS) [hereinafter Lemon Declaration] (discussing how behaviors exhibited by batterers are
based on male power and control over women, perpetuated by cultural and social norms where
men are deemed superior and dominant).
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roles, the immigration judge in Ms. B’s case found that Ms. B’s abuser
was motivated to harm her based on her gender and status in their
relationship as inferior. Yet, the judge in Ms. A’s case found that
“[w]hile country conditions evidence and some of the comments [her
abuser] made indicate that he may have believed that [Ms. A] was in a
subordinate position in their relationship,” the judge could not con-
clude “that such belief played an essential or principal role in the
abuse he inflicted.”67 Rather, the judge found that the abuse was “re-
lated to his own criminal tendencies and jealousy.”68 This rationale
defies logic: an abuser’s “jealousy” is inherently linked to a woman’s
gender and status in a relationship as the property of her partner.69
Precedential guidance on this point is lacking.
State Protection
In many, if not most, domestic violence asylum cases, the perse-
cutors are “private” actors, which requires that women prove their
government is “unable or unwilling” to protect them to establish eligi-
bility for protection. The “unable or unwilling” test is a disjunctive
one; each prong must be considered independently (that is to say, a
government may be willing to control an abuser but that does not
mean it is able to do so, and vice versa).70 U.S. law does not require
that women report their abuse to the police or to other authorities to
meet the unable or unwilling standard if doing so would have been
futile or would have placed the woman in danger (for example, at risk
for retaliation by her abuser or discrimination and mistreatment by
the police).71 The Board, as mentioned, did not reach this issue in
67. CGRS Database Case, No. 10283 (Immigration J. Dec. Jan. 14, 2015).
68. Id.
69. See Lemon Declaration, supra note 66 (discussing how abusers typically exhibit jealousy
which reflects their “belief that men have the right to own the women to whom they are married
or intimately related”).
70. See, e.g., Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 503 (3d Cir. 2011) (even if a government
has “displayed great willingness to protect,” this willingness “sheds no light on [the govern-
ment’s] ability to protect [an applicant]”); Hassan v. Gonzales, 484 F.3d 513, 519 n.2 (8th Cir.
2007) (noting fear of rape may still be well-founded even if laws prohibiting rape exist, if they’re
not generally enforced).
71. See, e.g., Ngengwe v. Mukasey, 543 F.3d 1029, 1036 (citing Makatengkeng v. Gonzales,
495 F.3d 876, 885 (8th Cir. 2007)); Lopez v. Att’y Gen., 504 F.3d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 2007);
Ornelas-Chavez v. Gonzales, 458 F.3d 1052, 1058 (9th Cir. 2006); Fiadjoe v. Att’y Gen., 411 F.3d
135, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2005); Matter of S-A-, 22 I&N 1328, 1330 (BIA 2000). The test is whether
government action reduces a woman’s fear to below the “well-founded fear” threshold required
for asylum, which the U.S. Supreme Court has explained is a one in ten chance. For withholding,
the threshold is higher requiring that an applicant have more than a 50% chance of persecution.
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 431, 440 (1987).
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Matter of A-R-C-G-, and it has not provided guidance for evaluating
the record in this regard in domestic violence cases.
When determining whether a woman’s failure to report was rea-
sonable, some immigration judges consider a woman’s testimony
about why she did not report, and also take into account country con-
ditions evidence regarding lack of enforcement of laws and a culture
of accepting violence against women.72 By contrast, other judges fail
to look to conditions in the country as corroborating a woman’s testi-
mony for why she did not trust the police or other authorities would
be able and willing to protect her. Judges also rely on the fact that
women successfully obtained protective orders against their partners
from the courts in order to find that the government was able and
willing to protect, notwithstanding repeated and unsanctioned viola-
tions of the orders.73 The Board has deemed a failure to consider
country conditions and violations of protective orders as legal error
when assessing the “unable or unwilling” element in a domestic vio-
lence case. However, it did so in an unpublished, non-binding
decision.74
Relocation
Few decisions on file with CGRS reach an analysis of safe and
reasonable relocation options for women in their home countries. In
one case where relocation was considered, the immigration judge
found that this was not an option for a Guatemalan woman whose
abuser knew where her family lived, and she did not have anywhere
else to move.75 To draw this conclusion, the judge looked to the appli-
cant’s circumstances, including her indigenous status, which limited
her relocation options due to, among other things, language barriers
and discrimination. In another case, the Board faulted a judge for fail-
ing to look at the individual circumstances of the woman.76 In revers-
ing, the Board instructed the judge to consider on remand the
woman’s testimony that her abuser found her after her previous at-
tempt to escape and whether, given those undisputed facts, relocation
would actually ensure her safety.
72. CGRS Database Case, No. 9730 (Immigration J. Dec. Apr. 2, 2015); CGRS Database
Case, No. 10283 (Immigration J. Dec. Jan. 15, 2015).
73. CGRS Database Case, No. 11579 (Immigration J. Dec. Nov. 17, 2014).
74. CGRS Database Case, No. 10627 (BIA Apr. 2, 2015); CGRS Database Case, No. 11335
(BIA Mar. 17, 2015).
75. CGRS Database Case, No. 10784 (Immigration J. Dec. Nov. 4, 2014).
76. CGRS Database Case, No. 11335 (BIA Mar. 17, 2015).
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The regulation governing the relocation test is relatively sparse.
Therefore, the Board’s analysis in the referenced case provides helpful
guidance for adjudicators by reiterating that “safe and reasonable” re-
location must take into account individual circumstances including in
domestic violence cases, for example, barriers to relocation for women
without economic resources and potential dangers they might face.
Because the Board did not publish its decision, the admonition to con-
sider certain relevant facts applies only to the judge in that case.
CONCLUSION
Women survivors of domestic violence seeking asylum in the
United States, including Central American women who are part of the
recent “surge,” have fled unimaginable horrors—beatings, rape, ver-
bal abuse, and death threats. They request protection from the U.S.
government where their own has failed them.77 The long-standing and
contentious debate over whether these women, if they succeed in
proving their cases, deserve such protection, has finally been resolved
in their favor. The highest immigration tribunal in the United States
ruled in August 2014 that domestic violence may be a basis for asylum.
The 2014 Matter of A-R-C-G- ruling advances women’s rights, consis-
tent with evolving precedent that recognizes gender-based persecution
as asylum-worthy. However, the ruling is narrow and does not provide
specific guidance for how to analyze all elements of these claims, leav-
ing significant discretion to immigration judges. This initial study of
post-A-R-C-G- jurisprudence demonstrates that a dearth of binding
standards as well as the lack of training for immigration judges on the
dynamics and sensitivities of domestic and other gender-based vio-
lence has continued to result in inconsistent and arbitrary decision-
making in immigration courts. Additional, comprehensive and clarify-
ing guidance is needed to ensure consistent adjudication and fair out-
comes in individual cases and engender confidence and efficiency of
the system as a whole.
77. The Northern Triangle countries have some of the highest rates of femicide and violence
against women in the world. A significant number of femicides occur in the context of domestic
relationships, even in situations where women have attempted to leave their abusers. See, e.g.,
CHILDHOOD AND MIGRATION IN CENTRAL AND NORTH AMERICA, supra note 11 (including sta-
tistics on rates of violence against women in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala); Karen
Musalo & Blaine Bookey, Crimes Without Punishment: An Update on Violence Against Women
and Impunity in Guatemala, 10 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 265, 269 (2013) (discussing
femicide in Guatemala and connection with domestic violence).
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